◦ In London, Lord Kitchener explained to his colleagues—including the representative of India, which had been alarmed by his correspondence with Hussein months before—why the moving of the caliphate was central to his strategy for the postwar world. At a meeting of the War Committee of the Cabinet on 19 March 1915, Lord Crewe said that two different views were taken in the India Office about the future of the Ottoman Empire. The Political Department wanted to sacrifice Turkey to Arabia, while the Military Department wanted to make Turkey as strong as possible as a barrier against a potential Russian threat. Minutes of the meeting record that LORD KITCHENER objected to the Military Department's plan. The Turks, he said, would always be under pressure from their strong Russian neighbour, with the result that the Khalifate might be to a great extent under Russian domination, and the Russian influence might indirectly assert itself over the Mohammedan part of the population of India. If, on the other hand, the Khalifate were transferred to Arabia, it would remain to a great extent under our influence.
◦ The day began to go badly when a French battleship mysteriously exploded and disappeared just before 2:00 in the afternoon. Two hours later two British battleships struck mines. A vessel sent to rescue one of them, the Irresistible, also struck a mine; and it and the Irresistible both sank. Then a French warship damaged by gunfire was beached. De Robeck reported to the Admiralty, however, that the rest of his ships would be ready to recommence action in three or four days. At the Admiralty in London, there was elation, for Naval Intelligence had discovered that when the action recommenced, the enemy would collapse. On the afternoon of 19 March, Captain William Reginald Hall, the Director of Naval Intelligence, brought Churchill and Fisher an intercepted, decoded message from the German Kaiser; they grasped its significance immediately. Churchill cried out in excitement that "they've come to the end of their ammunition," as indeed they had. Fisher waved the message over his head and shouted, "By God, I'll go through tomorrow" and then repeated "Tomorrow! We shall probably lose six ships, but I'm going through." Churchill and Fisher did not tell the Cabinet, for fear of compromising their intelligence sources, nor did they tell de Robeck; they merely cabled him that it was important not to give the impression that operations were suspended.
◦ Hankey told the Cabinet so; he told the Prime Minister so; and he recorded his opinion in letters and memoranda. In a diary entry for 19 March he recorded that "On the first day proposal was made I warned P. M., Lord K, Chief of Staff, L. George and Balfour that Fleet could not effect passage and that all naval officers thought so." Hankey indeed had issued such warnings, but a month later than he claimed. It was not on 13 January (when the Cabinet committee decided on the Dardanelles expedition) but on 10 February that he wrote to Balfour along those lines. Later still he spoke to Asquith. On 13 February, the Prime Minister noted that "I have just been having a talk with Hankey, whose views are always worth hearing. He thinks very strongly that the naval operations ... should be supported by landing a fairly strong military force. I have been for some time coming to the same opinion .. . "
◦ Erzurum Konsolos Yardımcısı von Scheubner-Richter’in 19 Mart 1915’te Büyükelçi Wangenheim’e gönderdiği raporda ise Gürcülerin bulunmadığı bölgelerde çıkması tasarlanan ayaklanma sonunda kurtarılan bölgelerin yönetiminin kendi beylerine bırakılması ve bu beyler yönetimindeki bölgelerin ise Umum Kafkasya Federasyonu’nu oluşturmaları gerektiği deklare edilmişti.
◦ Atatürk’ün, Maydos (Ecebat)’tan 19. Tümen birliklerine emri: “…Türlü kaynaklardan gelen bilgilerde, düsmanın çıkarma için hazırlıklarda bulunduğu anlasılmaktadır. ..Birlikler, kendi bölgelerinin savunma tertibatını bir an önce bitirmelidir”
◦ Unknown to Churchill and Fisher, at Maurice Hankey's suggestion, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Hall, had initiated negotiations with Talaat Bey, the young Turk leader, aimed at inducing the Ottoman Empire to leave the war in return for a large payment of money. The British and Turkish negotiators met at a seaport in European Turkey on 15 March. The negotiations failed because the British government felt unable to give assurances that the Ottoman Empire could retain Constantinople—so deeply were the British now committed to satisfying Russia's ambitions. Captain Hall had not yet learned of the collapse of the negotiations when, on the night of 19 March, he told Churchill of the plan to offer four million pounds to Turkey if she would leave the war. Churchill was aghast and Fisher was furious. At their insistence, Hall cabled his emissaries to withdraw the offer. Hall later recalled that Fisher started up from his chair and shouted "Four million? No, no. I tell you I'm going through tomorrow."
◦ 1916 yilinda casusluk faaliyeti ile düşman sahasına adam gönderilmesi faaliyetinin sürdürüldüğü, 3’üncü Ordu ile 2’nci Kolordu istihbarat şubeleri arasındaki yazışmalardan anlaşılmakta, hatta Ulu Köylü olup dönüşleri kararlaştırılmış olan casusların dönüş yaptığı 2’nci Kafkas ordusunun 19 Mart 1916 tarihli şifresinden anlaşılmaktadır. Ulu Köy’e sevk edilen Ulu Köylü Yakupoğullarından Ahmet oğlu Osman ve aynı köyden İbrahim oğlu Salih namındaki casuslardan biri Erik Yolu tarikiyle Maden’e, diğeri Alacadağ’ı aşarak Görele Deresi vadisinden Görele-Eynesil-Şarlı üzerinden Vakfıkebir’e gitmişler, kendilerinden bölgedeki (Maden, Çanakçı, Görele) piyade asker sayısı hakkında bilgi alınmıştır. Ayrıca bu casuslar, haber toplama faaliyetinde gezdikleri yerlerde top görmediklerini, Polathane’ye (Akçaabat) gelen erzak ve cephanenin mekkarilerle kıtalara sevk olunduğunu, Vakfıkebir-Görele-sahil yolunun tamir edildiğini ancak bu yolun koşulu top geçişine müsait olmadığını söylemişlerdir.
◦ 19 Mart 1920 tarihinde Cemiyet-i Akvam yetkilileri ile Türk Barış Antlaşması’nı hazırlayan İngiltere, Fransa ve İtalya temsilcileri ile bir araya gelmişlerdir. Toplantı sonrası hazırlanan bilgi notunda İtalya’nın kurulacak Ermeni devletine maddi yardımda bulunamayacağı açıklaması üzerine, Cemiyet-i Akvam temsilci Paul Montoux, İtilaf Devletlerinin maddi yardım yapmaması durumunda Ermeni devletinin kurulması umutlarını terk etmeleri gerektiğini ilettiğini yazmıştır.
◦ Atatürk’ün, Ankara’da bir Meclis toplanması yolunda acele seçim yapılması için vilâyetlere, mutasarrıflıklara ve kolordu komutanlarına genelgesi: “Ankara’da olağanüstü yetkiye sahip bir Meclis, millet islerini yönetmek ve denetlemek üzere toplanacaktır!”